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Introduction
In this paper, we consider a class of market microstructure models, in which some long-lived
market participants (“dealers”) repeatedly interact in a market that is open to short-lived market
participants (“traders”). We characterize equilibria that are robust to any form of asymmetry of
information among dealers.
It has been claimed in the market-microstructure empirical literature (see for instance Ellis,
Michaely, and O’Hara (2002)) that dealers have access to different sources of information and
that they need not be well aware of other dealers’ sources of private information. However, in
existing market microstructure models, tractability imposes strong informational assumptions,
and specific functional assumptions regarding the distribution of fundamentals and private sig-
nals.1 Because modeling dynamic interaction among asymmetrically informed dealers can be
a formidable task, the theory is silent about the robustness of canonical microstructure theory
predictions to changes in the dealers’ information environment.2 In practice, dealers’ actual infor-
mation structures are not directly observable, so that it is usually impossible to assess the extent
to which a given model’s assumptions on information structure reflect “real world” informational
asymmetries.
The objective of this paper is to provide a tractable price-formation theory delivering pre-
dictions that are robust to details in the information structure. To this purpose, we consider a
class of dynamic financial markets microstructure models in which risk-neutral financial inter-
mediaries (such as dealers or market-makers) interact with traders. For this class of models, we
characterize equilibria in which dealers’ dynamic pricing strategies remain optimal no matter the
private information of a dealer about the economy fundamentals (so called “belief-free equilibria”,
1For instance, almost all models assume that trading prices are set by equally uninformed dealers to a level
reflecting these dealers’ beliefs on fundamentals.
2At any point in time each dealer anticipates how its behavior affects its current expected payoff as well as
each competing dealer’s posterior beliefs and future behavior. The problem is even more complex if a dealer is
not certain about its competitors’ prior beliefs.
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BFE henceforth).3
There is no a priori reason why belief-free equilibria are more compelling than, for exam-
ple, the “classical” zero-profit equilibrium. Nevertheless, we believe that these equilibria are
interesting for a number of reasons. First, in terms of their scope: as we show, in a belief-free
equilibrium, hardly any assumption on the dealers’ information is called for. This seems more
realistic than assuming that all dealers share the same exact beliefs about fundamentals. Also
minimal assumptions are required concerning trading protocols, and the model is flexible enough
to encompass many real-world trading protocols. Second, in terms of their ability to explain seem-
ingly unrelated empirical findings: we present an example that supports various stylized facts:
price-volume correlation, volatility clustering, price bubbles, and inventory-trading correlations.
While each of these facts can be explained by some models, none delivers them simultaneously.
Third, in terms of tractability: we actually focus on a subset of belief-free equilibria that are
arguably as tractable as the classical zero-profit models in market microstructure. Finally, in
the presence of multiple equilibria, it might be sensible for dealers to coordinate on equilibria
generating positive profits. This is a feature of all belief-free equilibria.
All BFE equilibria enjoy the following properties: 1) Dealers can gain or lose money in the
short run, but their long-run profit is strictly positive independently of the asset’s fundamental
value. This contrasts with the traditional prediction that dealers’ expected per trading period
profit is nil; 2) Risk-neutral dealers tend to maintain balanced inventories and make profits trough
the intermediation of traders’ order flow. This contrasts with the view that (absent risk aversion
or institutional constraints on inventory size) inventory levels should not affect dealers’ behavior.4
Also, our finding de-emphasizes the role of information (about the asset) on dealers’ behavior.
In a BFE, what matters for a dealer is the level of quotes that induce an abundant but balanced
3See Hörner and Lovo (2009), Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2010) and Hörner, Lovo and Tomala (2010) for the
general definition and analysis of belief-free equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information.
4For instance, in Ho and Stoll (1981) balanced inventory results from dealers’ risk-aversion, whereas in Gromb
and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) it results from the dealers’ institutional inability to
take a position beyond a certain size. Our model displays neither factor.
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order flow from traders. Hence dealers can ignore all information that does not affect traders’
behavior. 3) As in the canonical market microstructure models, movement in asset quotes are
caused by the public information provided by the trading order flow. However, unlike in models
in which quotes reflect beliefs about fundamentals, it is not the case that given a sufficient amount
of public information, an asset trading price eventually stabilizes around its fundamental value.
In other words, equilibrium quotes need not reflect any of the dealers’ (Bayesian) belief, and
price sensitivity to trading volume does not fade away as public information accumulates. Thus,
long-term price volatility remains large even without exogenous shocks on fundamentals.
The rationale behind these results is as follows. First, dealers can always guarantee zero
profit by abstaining from trading. Because in equilibrium dealers’ strategy must be optimal no
matter the dealer’s belief about fundamentals, each dealer’s equilibrium long-term profit must
be positive for each possible value of fundamentals. Second, given the range of possible asset
values, a strategy leading to a sufficiently unbalanced inventory would correspond to a negative
value portfolio for some level of the asset fundamentals, and hence for some level of a dealer’s
belief about fundamentals. On the contrary, when the equilibrium strategy leads to sufficiently
balanced inventories, the asset fundamental value will have little impact on dealers’ profits. As a
result, in a BFE, dealers’ long term profit must mainly result from intermediation of traders’ order
flow. This is achieved through (what we refer to as) “exploiting periods” during which dealers
set quotes prompting a balanced order flow and make positive profit from the bid-ask spread.
Third, because the specific strategies that dealers adopt during exploiting periods depend on the
fundamentals, dealers’ equilibrium strategies must also display “exploring periods." During an
exploring period, dealers’ quotes prompt informative order flow from traders. Quotes react to
the order flow, which then eventually provides enough information about the quoting strategy
to be followed during exploiting periods. Because dealers might lose money during exploring
periods, exploring phases cannot last very long, and while they point to the right exploiting
strategy most often than not, with low probability they also lead to incorrect exploiting rounds.
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Hence, a Bayesian dealer could possibly disagree with the consensus view during an exploiting
phase. For such a dealer not to deviate, it must be that he expects the flow of public information
to correct this view rapidly. Hence, unlike Bayesian beliefs that take arbitrarily long to budge
once they are sufficiently degenerate, belief-free equilibrium prices must be sensitive to the order
flow at all times –hence, they cannot simply reflect Bayesian beliefs about fundamentals. As a
result, exploiting phases must always alternate with exploring phases, and quote sensitivity to
order flow cannot fade away.
In the first part of the paper, we illustrate the functioning of such belief-free equilibria in the
simple framework of the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model, modified in two respects. First,
to the standard quote driven market open to dealers making a market to traders, we add an
inter-dealer market only accessible to dealers. Second, we make no assumption about dealers’
private information.
The notion of belief-free equilibrium is more demanding than standard game-theoretic re-
finements. Therefore, it imposes stronger restrictions on equilibrium outcomes. Despite this,
there remains considerable leeway in their specification. This flexibility suffices to explain some
regularities documented in the empirical literature. First, because the flow of trade and any
other relevant public information is used by dealers as a coordination device, movements in
asset quotes are caused by the public information provided by the order flow or possibly the
exogenous arrival of news. This is consistent with a wide body of empirical work, spanning
from security markets (see for instance Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2002) and Boehmer
and Wu (2008)), bond markets (Pasquariello and Vega (2005)), currency markets (Evans and
Lyons (2002)), weather-sensitive commodity markets (Fleming, Kirby and Ostdiek (2006)), etc.
Second, the alternation of exploring phases and exploiting phases implies that periods of high
price volatility follow periods of low volatility, that is, high-volatility events tend to cluster in
time.5 Exploring phases attract informed traders, leading to quotes that are highly sensitive to
5See Cont (2001) for a discussion of volatility clustering and other stylized facts.
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the volume of trade. In exploiting phases, trading flow is balanced and originates from liquidity
traders; as a result quote volatility is reduced. Third, the inter-dealer market is used as a tool to
redistribute among dealers the profits and losses they make against traders. As a consequence,
trades in the quote driven market are a predictor of the trade a dealer subsequently makes in
the inter-dealer market. That is, a dealer buying (selling) in the quote driven market is more
likely to later sell (resp. buy) to other dealers in the inter-dealer market. This provides an expla-
nation to the finding that dealers use the inter-dealer market to re-balance their inventory (see
for instance Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993), Reiss and Werner (1998) and (2005), Hansch, Naik
and Viswanathan (1998), Evans and Lyons (2002)). Broadly speaking, dealers prefer sharing the
profits that result from imperfect competition to competing them away.6 As a result, whereas in
the short-run dealers might gain or lose money, in the long run, they achieve positive profits. In
fact, long-run profits are positive not only on average but also ex post, i.e., independently of the
fundamental value of the asset.
Compared to the zero-profit equilibrium (GME henceforth) described by Glosten and Milgrom
(1985), both explain correlation between trading volume and price changes. However, whereas
in a GME dealers set quotes equal to the asset’s expected value given past and current public
information, so that expected per-period profits are zero, neither property holds in a BFE. These
traditional predictions are not robust to changes in the dealers’ information structure. A GME
does not predict volatility clustering, nor does it explain inter-dealer trading. Furthermore, while
a GME only applies to situations in which dealers are symmetrically uninformed, a BFE remains
an equilibrium no matter the extent of information asymmetries among dealers.
In the second part of the paper, we consider a broader class of market microstructure models,
in which some long-run market participants (“dealers”) repeatedly interact in a market that is
open to short-run market participants (“traders”). The class of models we analyze is broad along
6While our model focuses on the market for a single asset, its underlying logic of dealers’ shared profits carries
over to markets for different assets. This explains the finding by Ellis et al. (2002) that each market has a
dominant dealer who makes most of the profit.
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a number of dimensions. First it encompasses different trading protocols. Second, it comprises
both fundamental uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about the fundamental value of the asset) and
non-fundamental uncertainty (for instance, uncertainty about the fraction of informed traders in
the economy, the precision of their signals or traders’ preferences). Third, within a given trading
protocol and type of uncertainty, all specifications of asymmetries of information among dealers
are covered.
We show that a dynamic trading game admits belief-free equilibria as long as the static game
describing one trading round satisfies four simple conditions. Loosely speaking, for any given
value of the fundamentals that is statistically learnable from the traders’ behavior: first, there
exists a way for dealers to earn a positive profit; second, there also exists a way to lose money;
third, dealers have a way to “punish” a dealer in case of an observable deviation. The fourth
condition is more technical but obtains in particular whenever inter-dealer trading is allowed.
Whenever the trading game satisfies these conditions, and discounting between consecutive
trading rounds is sufficiently low, a “folk theorem” type result holds: for any given candidate
dealers’ strategy profile displaying the exploring and the exploiting features (as in the illustrative
example), there is a belief-free equilibrium whose outcome coincides with the candidate profile.
What matters for our construction is that long-run market participants can use public infor-
mation to coordinate on mutually profitable actions. Financial intermediaries that repeatedly
meet in a stock market possess this ability. Implicit collusion in the stock market has been
documented by Christie and Schultz (1994), Christie, Harris and Schultz (1994) and Ellis, et al.
(2002). Evidence of long-term relationships is reported by Battalio, Ellul and Jennings (2007).
In the market microstructure literature, Dutta and Madhavan (1997) model implicit collusion
among dealers, while Benveniste et al. (1992) and Desgranges and Foucault (2005) analyze
long-term relationships. These papers assume either no informational asymmetry, or short-lived
informational asymmetries. Here instead, the state of nature is chosen once and for all, so that a
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dealer owning some private information might possibly take advantage of it over a long horizon.7
Few theoretical papers analyze the effect of asymmetric information among dealers. Even
fewer do so within a dynamic framework. Some static examples in which dealers, or more gen-
erally liquidity providers, are asymmetrically informed are Roël (1988), Bloomfield and O’Hara
(2000), de Frutos and Manzano (2005) and Boulatov and George (2010). Within a dynamic
framework, Moussa Saley and De Meyer (2003) and Calcagno and Lovo (2006) study the case of
one better-informed price maker. De Meyer (2010) considers the case of two-sided incomplete in-
formation. However, their findings are sensitive to the precise assumptions regarding the dealers’
information. Du and Zhu (2012) results are closer in spirit to our work. Within the framework
of a double auction they show that for a specific additive functional form of bidders values, the
static auction has an ex-post equilibrium and that this property extends to the repeated auction
leading to a belief-free equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents an example based on the model of
Glosten and Milgrom. Section 2 develops the main model and states the central result. Section
3 discusses extensions to imperfect monitoring about dealers’ actions, non-stationary states of
nature and dealers’ strategies based on private information. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are
in Appendix.
1 A Model of Price Formation
In this section, we illustrate the definition, the logic and the main features of a belief-free equi-
librium. The purpose of this section is not to construct a model that replicates all institutional
features of a specific existing market, but rather to illustrate the logic of belief-free equilibria
in a simple, well-known financial market microstructure framework à la Glosten and Milgrom
(1985). In Section 3, we illustrate how the equilibrium strategy can be modified to account for
7The same results hold if the frequency of trading is high compared to the frequency with which the state of
nature changes.
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some institutional features of real markets that are ignored in the baseline model.
Set-up: A risky asset is exchanged for money among short-lived traders and n > 1 long-lived
dealers (n is finite). Trading takes place over infinitely many periods t = 1, 2, . . . At time 0,
Nature chooses the state ω in the set Ω (with at least four elements). The asset’s fundamental
value is W (ω) = v(ω) + ψ(ω), where v(ω) ∈ {v1, v2} and ψ(ω) ∈ {e, e}, with e < 0 < e and
0 < v1 < v2. Thus, W (ω) takes values in {v1 + e, v1 + e, v2 + e, v2 + e}. As in Back and Barush
(2004), a public release of information takes place at a random time θ, and conditional on it
not having occurred yet, the probability that it occurs in the next period is constant. After the
public announcement, all dealers’ positions are liquidated at price W (ω).
The stage trading game: Each trading round t unfolds as follows. First, all dealers
simultaneously choose their actions in an inter-dealer market and post their bid and ask quotes
in a quote driven market. The inter-dealer market is closed to traders.8 Second, a trader
randomly arrives in the quote driven market, observes dealers’ quotes, decides whether to trade
or not one unit of the asset with dealers and then leaves the market.
As far as the inter-dealer market is concerned, it is sufficient to focus on its reduced form.9 We
denote by AIDi the finite set of actions available to dealer i in the inter-dealer market in any given
period t. Let AID := ×iAIDi denote the set of dealers’ action profiles in the inter-dealer market.
Given aID ∈ AID, let QIDi (aID) ∈ R and P IDi (aID) ∈ R denote the resulting net transfers of the
asset and cash, respectively, from other dealers to dealer i. Note that
∑
i
QIDi (a
ID) =
∑
i
P IDi (a
ID) = 0, (1)
meaning that the inter-dealer market leads to cash and asset redistribution among dealers. We
8We can dispense with the introduction of an inter-dealer market. In this case, transactions across dealers
occur through the quote driven market.
9See for instance Evans and Lyons (2002) for a specification of FX inter-dealer market.
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Inter-dealer market
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b
b
b
{βti , αti}ni=1
{aIDi t}ni=1
s
Transfer of cash and asset among dealers
Transfer of cash and asset
between dealers and traders
dealers’ quotes trader t’s market order
Figure 1: Stage trading round.
assume that there exists a no trade action aIDi ∈ AIDi allowing a dealer i to abstain from trading
in this market. Also, assume that there are Q > 0 and P > 0, large but finite, such that any
vector of (QID, P ID) of inter-dealer transfers satisfying (1) and |QIDi | ≤ Q, |P IDi | ≤ P for all i
can be attained with an appropriate (possibly mixed) action profile aID ∈ ∆AID.10
Let αti and β
t
i be dealer i’s bid and ask quotes posted in the quote driven market in period
t, respectively. Quotes belong to a finite grid G of non-negative prices whose largest (smallest)
element is larger than v2 + e (resp. smaller than v1 − e). Let βt := maxi βti and αt := mini αti
denote the best bid and ask quotes in period t. Overall, an action profile for dealers in one
trading round specifies for each dealer the action that it takes in the inter-dealer market as well
as the bid and ask quotes it posts in the quote driven market. Formally, the set of dealers’ action
profiles is A := AID × Gn × Gn. We make no assumption about the private information of any
given dealer regarding the true state ω, nor about the distribution of W (ω). In a belief-free
equilibrium, defined below, each dealer’s strategy must be optimal for each realization of the
state ω, so the profile constitutes a (subgame-perfect) equilibrium independently of the presence
or the extent of informational asymmetries among dealers and of dealers’ beliefs about W (ω).
10Here and in what follows, ∆B denotes the set of distributions over a finite set B.
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Assumptions: Traders have information about ω, but they also come to the market for liq-
uidity reasons unrelated to ω. Namely, we posit that traders’ information is about the v(ω)
component of W (ω), but not the ψ(ω) component. Let at ∈ A be any given dealers’ action
profile. Then F (ω, at, s) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability that, after observing at, trader t chooses
action
s ∈ S := {buy, sell, no trade, buy and sell},
given that the state is ω. Because traders have no information about the value of the ψ(ω)
component of the asset fundamental, their behavior cannot depend on ψ. Thus, with some abuse
of notation, assume:
Non-learnable States (NLS): If v(ω) = v(ω′), then F (ω, at, s) = F (ω′, at, s) =: F (v(ω), at, s)
for all at ∈ A and s ∈ S.
By contrast, traders’ demand may depend on the realization of v(ω). That is, there exists
a subset A(v1, v2) ⊆ A of dealers’ action profiles for which traders’ behavior is sensitive to the
value of v(ω). Formally:
Learnable States (LS): There is a non-empty set A(v1, v2) ⊆ A such that, if at ∈ A(v1, v2),
then
F (v1, a
t, s) 6= F (v2, at, s),
for some s ∈ S.
Assumption LS states that because some traders might have private information about the
v(ω) component of the asset value W (ω), this component affects both the asset’s liquidation
value and traders’ behavior. More precisely, there are suitable choices of dealers’ actions (i.e.,
for at ∈ A(v1, v2)), for which the distribution of traders’ reactions s is measurable with respect
to v(ω). In general, this obtains as long as the bid-ask spread αt − βt is neither too large to
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induce no trading, nor negative so as to induce arbitrage trading. Thus, as long as at is in
A(v1, v2), a sufficiently long history of the traders’ order flow allows to statistically tell apart
whether v(ω) = v1 or v(ω) = v2.
To the contrary, Assumption NLS means that the ψ(ω)-component of the asset value W (ω)
affects the asset liquidation value, but because no trader is informed of it, the way traders react
to dealers’ quotes does not depend on the true ψ(ω). As a consequence, trading flow does not
allow to tell apart whether ψ(ω) = e, or ψ(ω) = e. That is to say, LS implies that v(ω) is
statistically learnable from traders’ behavior, whereas NLS implies that ψ(ω) is not.
We also assume that traders never buy the asset at a price that is too high nor sell at a
price that is too low. The range of prices at which traders do trade depends on traders’ private
information and hence on the level of v(ω). Formally,
Elastic Trader Demand (ETD): There is ρ > 0 such that
F (v(ω), at, sell) = 0 for βt < v(ω)− ρ
F (v(ω), at, buy) = 0 for αt > v(ω) + ρ,
for all ω ∈ Ω.
For concreteness, assume that the trader’s buy and sell order are executed against the best
ask, αt, and bid, βt, quotes, respectively. Let ui(ω, a
t) denote dealer i’s expected payoff, or
reward, in period t given the state ω and dealers’ action profile at.11 Dealers’ aggregate expected
11Here, expectations are taken with respect to the possible trader’s orders (i.e., buy, sell and no trade) given
the fundamentals ω. For instance, if orders are executed by the dealers setting the best quotes,
ui(ω, a
t) = (W (ω)− βti)F (ω, at, sell)1{βt
i
=βt}ηβ(a
t) + (αti −W (ω))F (ω, at, buy)1{αt
i
=αt}ηα(a
t)
+ W (ω)qIDi (a
t) + cIDi (a
t),
where ηβ and ηα are tie-breaking rules applied in case more than one dealer sets the best bid or ask, respectively.
However equation (2) holds no matter the identity of the dealer executing a trader’s order as long as this order
is executed at the best price.
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payoff in period t can be written as
U(ω, at) :=
∑
i
ui(ω, a
t) = (W (ω)− βt)F (v(ω), at, sell) + (αt −W (ω))F (v(ω), at, buy). (2)
Condition ETD and expression (2) imply that dealers’ aggregate trading stage payoff U(ω, at)
is positive independently of the non-learnable component ψ(ω) only if at induces a bounded
change in dealers’ aggregate inventory. That is, only if 12
−ρ
e
<
F (v(ω), at, sell)− F (v(ω), at, buy)
F (v(ω), at, sell) + F (v(ω), at, buy)
< −ρ
e
. (3)
In other words, only a relatively balanced traders’ order flow can guarantee that dealer’s aggregate
profit be non-negative for some realization of the non-learnable component ψ(ω). On the other
hand, a positive bid-ask spread inducing a non-nil but relatively balanced traders’ order flow
guarantees that dealers’ aggregate profit is positive independently of the asset value W (ω).
Namely we assume:
Positive Payoffs (PP): For any given ω ∈ Ω, there is a non-empty set set A⋆(ω) ⊂ A such
that if at ∈ A⋆(ω), then βt < αt and F (v(ω), at, sell) = F (v(ω), at, buy) > 0.
Note that for at ∈ A⋆(ω), we have
U(ω, at) = (αt − βt)F (v(ω), at, sell) > 0. (4)
Thus, PP implies that, if the state is ω, and dealers pick their action in A⋆(ω), they make strictly
positive aggregate profit from pure intermediation, i.e., without taking a net position in the asset.
This implies that given the true state ω, dealers’ aggregate profits from setting a ∈ A⋆(ω) remain
strictly positive independently of the asset’s fundamental value W (ω).
12Inequality (3) is obtained noting that condition ETD implies U(ω, at) ≤ (W (ω)−v(ω)+ρ)F (v(ω), at, sell)+
(v(ω) + ρ−W (ω))F (v(ω), at, buy).
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Consider the partition Ωˆ = {ωˆ1, ωˆ2} of the set Ω, where ωˆ1 := {ω|v(ω) = v1} and ωˆ2 := Ω\ωˆ1.
Fix j ∈ {1, 2}. Note that because of NLS, the traders’ behavior does not change with ω′ ∈ ωˆj.
It follows from the assumptions that for any given ωˆ ∈ Ωˆ, the static trading game satisfies the
following four properties:
1. Positive maximum payoffs: there is a dealers’ action profiles for which their trading round
payoff is strictly positive, independently of ω′ ∈ ωˆ. For instance, for a ∈ A⋆(ω′), expression
(4) implies U(ω′, at) > 0 for all ω′ ∈ ωˆ and one can choose the inter-dealer market action
profile so that each dealer gets a strictly positive share of the aggregate payoff U(ω′, at).
2. Negative minimum payoffs: There is a dealers’ action profile for which their trading round
payoff is negative independently of ω′ ∈ ωˆ. There are many ways dealers’ can make an
aggregate loss that can be “shared” among dealers in the inter-dealer market.13
3. Non-positive expected payoffs: For any given dealer i, and any probability distribution
µ ∈ ∆ωˆ, the other dealers have some action profiles a−i(µ) forcing dealer i’s trading round
expected payoff to be non-positive (the expectation is w.r.t. the distribution µ). Formally,
max
ai
∑
ω∈ωˆj
µ(ω)ui(ω, ai, a−i(µ)) ≤ 0.
For example, if dealers other than dealer i adopt the no-trade actions aID−i in the inter-dealer
market and then set quotes such that mink 6=i αk = maxk 6=i βk = v(ωˆ) +
∑
ω∈ωˆj
µ(ω)ψ(ω),
then dealer i’s trading round expected payoff (computed according to µ) cannot be positive.
4. Non-equivalent payoffs: There exist feasible payoffs in which any given dealer has a lower
profit than any other dealer’s. For instance, fix dealer i and take an action profile a ∈ A⋆(ω′)
13For example, by setting at such that v+e < βt = αt and F (ω′, at, sell) > F (ω′, at, buy), it results U(ω′, qt) ≤
(v + e− βt)(F (ω′, at, sell)− F (ω′, at, buy)) < 0 for all ω′ ∈ ωˆj.
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resulting in a strictly positive aggregate payoff that is then shared in the inter-dealer market
leaving to dealer i strictly less than what each other dealer gets.
The repeated game: We can now move to the repeated game. The stage game payoffs (or
rewards) of the dealers are discounted at the common factor δ < 1 and the (overall) game payoff
is the average discounted sum of rewards. The discount factor δ accounts both for the dealers’
time preference and for the possibility that the public information gets released in the current
period.14 In each period, dealers’ actions and traders’ reactions are observed by all dealers. Let
H t denote the set of public histories ht = {aτ , sτ}t−1τ=0. Given some sequence of action profiles
{at}∞t=1 by the dealers, dealer i’s expected payoff in state ω is15
∞∑
t=1
(1− δ)δtui(ω, at). (5)
A public strategy profile (strategy henceforth) is a mapping σ : ∪tH t → ×i∆Ai. A strategy
σ and a state ω induce a probability distribution over histories in the standard fashion. Let
Vi(ω, σ|ht) denote dealer i’s expected continuation payoff after observing the public history ht
given state ω and strategy profile σ.
Definition 1 A belief-free equilibrium (hereafter, BFE) is a strategy profile σ∗ such that, for
every state ω, σ∗ is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated game with rewards u(ω, ·),
that is, of the repeated game with complete information in which the state ω is common knowledge
among dealers:
σ∗i ∈ argmax σiVi(ω, σi, σ∗−i|ht), (6)
for all players i, all ω ∈ Ω, all t and all ht ∈ H t.
14Allowing for a stochastic discount factor complicates exposition but does not affect results as long as the
discount factor remains close enough to one.
15Here, expectation is taken with respect to the possible realizations of traders’ orders {st}∞t=1, taking the state
ω as given.
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Some remarks are in order. First, a BFE is a subgame-perfect equilibrium given any initial
prior distribution of dealers’ belief about ω and any additional private information a dealer
might possess.16 Second, a BFE is an equilibrium even if dealers are ambiguity averse, as long
as ambiguity pertains to the distribution of the possible states of nature ω ∈ Ω.17
The equilibrium: Our purpose is to construct a particular class of equilibria. Here, we de-
scribe the logic underlying their structure for the simple model presented above. To begin with,
let us consider the canonical equilibrium (i.e., the GME) that can be obtained if we make the
additional assumptions that all dealers are equally uninformed and start from the common prior
p0 = Pr(v(ω) = v2) and that E[ψ(ω)] = 0. Then there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which,
in any period t: (i) each dealer’s expected profit is nil; (ii) there is no trade in the inter-dealer
market; (iii) best bid and ask quotes in the quote driven market satisfy
αt = α(pt) := E
[
v(ω)|ht−1, st = buy] , (7)
βt = β(pt) := E
[
v(ω)|ht−1, st = sell] , (8)
pt+1 = φB(p
t, at, st), (9)
where φB(p
t, (αt, βt), st) denotes the posterior probability that v(ω) = v2 resulting from the prior
pt and from the trader’s reaction st to dealers’ quotes at.18 This equilibrium has the advantage
of being Markovian: first, in every period t, best bid and ask quotes only depend on dealers’
16To see this, note that in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, dealers’ strategies satisfy
σ∗i ∈ argmax σiE
[
Vi(ω, σi, σ
∗
−i|ht)|Ii
]
,
where expectations are taken with respect to both the possible states ω and the possible realizations of traders’
orders {st}∞t=1, and Ii is dealer i’s private information. Hence, a BFE is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, but a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium need not be belief-free.
17Unlike in Easley and O’Hara (2010), where some of the traders are ambiguity averse, here ambiguity aversion
applies to dealers.
18In order to simplify the exposition and notation we neglect the rounding required from the fact that quotes
belong to a grid.
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common belief pt; second, next period dealers’ common posterior beliefs pt+1 only depend on the
common prior pt and on (at, st), dealers’ and trader’s actions at time t. However this quoting
strategy is not an equilibrium as soon as there is at least one dealer whose belief that v(ω) = v2
is not pt.19
In a BFE, the same dynamic quoting strategy must be optimal no matter the belief a dealer
might have about the true ω. Because dealers beliefs might differ arbitrarily, a dealer’s strategy
must be optimal no matter what the true realization of ω is. We first briefly illustrate how, if
dealers are patient enough, this can be achieved with strategies that have a Markov structure that
is as simple as the one of the canonical equilibrium. Initially, dealers post quotes that depend on
an arbitrary given distribution on the possible values of v(ω), we will call this distribution the
market measure. Assumption LS guarantees that these quotes can be chosen in A(v1, v2) so that
the resulting flow of trade provides information about the true v(ω). This information affects the
value of the market measure and hence the evolution of quotes. This is what we call an exploring
phase. None of the dealers’ beliefs need reflect the market measure, but nevertheless no dealer
deviates. This is because the “Non-positive expected payoffs” property guarantees that other
dealers can ensure that the deviating dealer makes zero profits with sufficiently low discount rate
(using standard repeated-game logic). The order flow eventually conveys sufficient information
about the true value of v(ω) and then dealers switch to an exploiting phase where quotes belong
to A⋆(ω), that is: best bid and ask quotes induce a balanced order flow and provide dealers with a
flow of aggregate profit that is strictly positive no matter the value ofW (ω). Each dealer obtains
a strictly positive share of this profit through the redistribution of cash and asset taking place in
the inter-dealer market. In response to the order flow during an exploiting phase, however, play
can revert to the exploring phase, and so on. The reason why an exploiting phase cannot last
forever is that a dealer who disagrees with the consensus asset value must be given incentives to
19To see this, note that if at some time t, dealer i’s belief that v(ω) = v2 is p
t
i 6= pt, then dealer i has a profitable
deviation that consists in setting either βti > β(p
t) or αt < α(pt).
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play along and wait for play to shift towards the asset value that he might believe in. To preserve
the Markovian structure, the level of current quotes and the transition from one phase into the
other must only depend on the current level of the market measure (and possibly on the level
of dealers aggregate inventory). At the same time, no matter the current level of the market
measure and a dealer belief about ω, the dealer must expect that the play will shift toward the
correct exploiting phase within a bounded period of time. Otherwise, even a patient dealer would
prefer to deviate and generate extra profits in the current trading round (even if held down to
zero profits afterwards), rather than to make losses during the long transition period required
for the market measure to adjust to what it thinks the right exploiting phase is. This is possible
only if, first, during an exploiting phase the market measure “transition rule” attaches decreasing
probability to states that are unlikely in view of the flow of information provided by traders’
orders; second, during an exploiting phase the market measure is not too persistent, but instead
is sensitive to the new public information provided by traders’ orders. Bayesian updating, for
instance, would not satisfy these two properties: while it allows to pin down the true v(ω) almost
surely eventually, it is too persistent for our purpose: once the market measure is sufficiently
concentrated on a state, it takes arbitrarily long for a Bayesian belief to budge.
A formal description: To define equilibrium play more precisely, consider the partition Ωˆ =
{ωˆ1, ωˆ2} and fix some small ε > 0 and some arbitrary pi0 ∈ Π := [ε/4, 1− ε/4] as the initial
weight the market measure assigns to ωˆ2. The following updating rule φ : Π × A × S → Π is
an example of rule that allows to identify the true state but is less persistent than a Bayesian
updating rule:
pit+1 = φ(pit, at, st) := argmin
π∈Π
∥∥pi − φB(pit, at, st)∥∥ . (10)
The (on-path) equilibrium play can then be seen as the alternation of two type of phases:
exploring phases and exploiting phases. Whenever pit ∈ [ε, 1 − ε], the game is in an exploring
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phase and dealers’ actions are such that at ∈ A(v1, v2). This guarantees that dealers’ quotes
induce an informative flow of trades in the quote driven market. Thus, as time passes the market
measure attaches more and more weight to the true ωˆ. An exploiting phase is defined to start
as soon as the market measure attaches enough weight to a particular state. Namely, whenever
pit < ε (resp., pit > 1 − ε), the game is in the ωˆ1-exploiting phase (resp. ωˆ2-exploiting phase).
In this phase, at ∈ A⋆(ωˆ1) (resp. at ∈ A⋆(ωˆ2)). This guarantees that dealers gain the spread
without taking a net permanent position in the asset. In a BFE, a dealer’s payoff must be positive
no matter its belief about ψ(ω), a component that, because of NLS, cannot be integrated by
the market measure. Assumption PP guarantees that for any given v(ω), dealer’s can maintain
balanced aggregate positions that generate strictly positive aggregate profits that do not depend
on the asset true value W . However, the recurrence of exploring phases can lead dealers to
accumulate relatively unbalanced portfolios leading to average inventories that would not satisfy
condition (3) and hence to dealers’ aggregate long term profits that are negative for some value
of ψ(ω). This can be easily avoided by appropriately biasing dealers’ quotes on the basis of the
current level of their aggregate inventory, so as to induce traders to absorb dealers’ excessive
inventory .
Finally to make sure that each single dealer makes strictly positive profits, dealers can use the
inter-dealer market at time t to share the dealers’ aggregate positions and trades resulting from
the orders at time t− 1. A sharing rule and resulting inter-dealer trade can be easily set so that
at beginning of each round, each dealer i gets a strictly positive fraction of dealers’ aggregate
profit or loss resulting from the trade in the previous round made in the quote driven market.
Overall, we have defined a partial strategy profile, i.e., a mapping σ : Π × S → ∆A, so that
dealers’ actions in the inter-dealer market and dealers’ quotes at time t only depend on st−1 and
on pit and possible on the level of dealers’ aggregate inventory. This partial strategy together
with the market measure updating rule ψ defined in (10) satisfies the following two properties:
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It is ε-learning : For any current level of the market measure pit ∈ Π, the expected time that
it takes for the market measure to assign at least probability 1− ε to the true state is bounded,
uniformly in pit.
It is ε-exploiting : Whenever the market measure assigns at least probability 1− ε to the true
state ωˆ, each dealer’s trading round payoff is strictly positive.
In Section 2, we consider a generalization of this microstructure model, and show that, as
long as the general trading game satisfies Properties 1–4, one can define partial strategies that
are ε-learning and ε-exploiting. The main result establishes that any such strategy profile defines
a behavior that coincides with a belief-free equilibrium outcome, provided the dealers are patient
enough.
We conclude this section with an example to illustrate some salient differences between such
a BFE and the GME.
1.1 BFE Market Making vs. zero expected profit equilibrium: An
Example
We consider here a specification of the model outlined above to compare dealers’ quotes in a
BFE to the quote resulting from the canonical belief-based equilibrium in which dealers make zero
expected profit in every period. This is the equilibrium characterized by Glosten and Milgrom
(1985), referred to as GME.
We assume that half of the population of traders is composed of potential buyers. The
remainder are potential sellers. Traders trade both for liquidity and speculative reasons. They
are informed about the component v(ω), but not about the ψ(ω) component. The following
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specification of the function F for βt ≤ αt, satisfies Assumptions NLS, LS, PP and ETD:20
F (v(ω), at, sell) = max
{
0,min
{
1
2
,
βt − v(ω) + ρ
4ρ
}}
, (11)
F (v(ω), at, buy) = max
{
0,min
{
1
2
,
v(ω) + ρ− αt
4ρ
}}
, (12)
F (v(ω), at, no trade) = 1− F (ω, βt, sell)− F (ω, αt, buy). (13)
First, let us consider the GME. In this case, two additional assumptions are required: first,
dealers are equally uninformed with belief pt, and second, E[ψ(ω)] = 0. Then, for ρ >
√
2(v2−v1),
we can express time t ask and bid quotes resulting from dealers’ zero-profit condition as
α(pt) := E[v|ht] + ρ
2
− 1
2
√
ρ2 − 4Var[v|ht], (14)
β(pt) := E[v|ht]− ρ
2
+
1
2
√
ρ2 − 4Var[v|ht]. (15)
where E[v|ht] and Var[v|ht] are the expectation and the variance of v(ω), respectively, computed
using the common belief pt that evolves according to (9).
Now, let us consider the following BFE. Fix some small ε > 0 and pi0 ∈ Π and let pit evolve
according to equation (10), so that pit ∈ Π for all t. We say that for pi > 1 − ε (resp. for
pi < ε), the game is in v1-exploiting phase (resp. v2-exploiting phase). Fix d and c such that
0 < c < d < ρ − c. Let invt denote dealers aggregate inventory at t and let ct := c(invt),
where c(.) is decreasing satisfying c(0) = 0. During a v-exploiting phase, the best ask and bid
equilibrium quotes satisfy
αt = v + d+ ct, (16)
βt = v − d+ ct, (17)
20Namely, A⋆(ω) is the set of a ∈ A such that (αt, βt) = (v(ω) + γ, v(ω)− γ) with γ ∈ (0, ρ). The set A(v1, v2)
satisfies αt ≥ βt with αt < v2 + ρ or βt > v1 − ρ, so that F (v1, at, s) 6= F (v2, at, s) for some s ∈ S. Furthermore
F (v(ω), at, sell) and F (v(ω), at, buy) are nil for βt < v(ω)− ρ and αt < v(ω) + ρ, respectively
20
respectively. For pit ∈ [ε, 1− ε], the game is in the exploring phase and best ask and bid quotes
satisfy
αt = α(pit) + d+ ct, (18)
βt = β(pit)− d+ ct. (19)
Note that for a level of the market measure in the BFE that is identical to the Bayesian belief
in the GME, best quotes in the two equilibria differ by at most d+ ct. However, the evolution of
dealers’ belief can substantially differ across the two equilibria. As a result, the same history of
past trades may lead to sharply different quotes in GME and in BFE.
Namely, in a BFE quotes are intrinsically more volatile than in the GME. This is due to the
fact that in the GME, dealers’ eventual belief will attach probability arbitrarily close to 1 to
the true value of v. This cannot happen for the BFE market measure, which can never be too
concentrated on a given state and hence remains unstable. Thus, independently of the previous
history of trade, and on dealers’ actual beliefs about v(ω), the market measure and quotes will
remain sensitive to the trading volume. As a result, exploring phases are recurrent. This is
illustrated in Figure 2 that reports a simulation of the two equilibria for for v(ω) = v1 (blue line
for BFE and red dashed line for GME).21 The sequence of potential buying and selling traders
is the same for the two equilibria. The right panel of Figure 2 reports the evolution of dealers’
aggregate inventory for the two equilibria. The left panel reports the evolution of the market
measure in a BFE and of the Bayesian belief in the GME. Because in the simulation v(ω) = v1,
traders tend to sell more than buy the asset. As a result in GME dealers’ aggregate inventory
tends to explode. Not so in the BFE where dealer’s aggregate inventory remain more balanced
thanks to the bias in quotes ct. Exploiting phases correspond to the periods in which the market
21The parameters used for this simulation are: v1 = $15, v2 = $18, ρ = 15, d = $0.05, ε = 0.05, p
0 = pi0 = 0.5,
e = −e = 3 and c(invt) = −0.02invt. The Figure reports time series of 3000 trades.
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measure is below the threshold ε (left graphic, solid magenta line). In these regions volatility
and sensitivity to the volume of trade are low. Exploring phases occur when the market measure
is above ε and display higher volatility and sensitivity to the trading volume. This is illustrated
in Figure 3: the negative relation between the evolution of dealers’ aggregate inventory and the
market measure is stronger in exploring phases than in exploiting phases, whereas it is negligible
in GME.
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Figure 2: Red dashed line are used for the GME and blue solid lines for BFE. The left panel displays
the evolution of the BFE market measure and of the GME Bayesian belief. The right panel reports the
evolution of dealers aggregate inventory in the GME and in the BFE.
Figure 4 represents the evolution of quotes in the GME and in the BFE. In both cases, the
flow of trade provides enough information about v(ω) allowing the Bayesian dealers’ belief to
eventually converge to the truth about v(ω). In the GME, this leads to a vanishing volatility
and bid ask spread with quotes that remain arbitrary close to v1. This is illustrated in the left
panel of Figure 4.
In the BFE, quotes keep moving with the market measure depicted in Figure 2. Note that the
spread remains bounded away from 0 even when the market measure is relatively concentrated,
leading to an exploiting phase (see Figure 4, right panel). As a result, while in the GME the
average dealers’ aggregate per-period profit quickly converges to 0, it is of the same magnitude
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Figure 3: Market measure and dealers’ inventory in an exploiting phase (left panel) and an exploring
phases (right panel).
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Figure 4: Evolution of bid and ask quotes in the GME (left panel) and in the BFE (right panel). Ask
quotes and bid quotes are in blue, and magenta, respectively.
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as d in the BFE (See Figure 5).
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Figure 5: Evolution of the average per-period profit taking ψ(ω) = 0 in GM (red dashed line) and in
the BFE (blue solid line).
Note that a dealer’s ex post profit also depends on the value of ψ(ω) ∈ {e, e}. Figure 6
represents the ex post cumulative profit for ψ(ω) = e and ψ(ω) = e. Note that in the GME (left
panel of Figure 6), the dealers’ cumulative profit remains negative for at least one realization
of ψ(ω). In the BFE, the dealers’ cumulative profit eventually becomes positive no matter the
realized ψ(ω). This can be achieved also thanks to the fact that dealers aggregate inventory does
not explode.
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Figure 6: Cumulative dealers’ profits for ψ(ω) = 0 (dashed line), ψ(ω) = e (blue line) and ψ(ω) = e
(red line).
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We stress that GME is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the economy considered in this
example only if dealers are equally uninformed, have common initial prior Pr[v(ω) = v2] = p
0
and E [ψ(ω)] = 0. The BFE remains a perfect Bayesian equilibrium even when dealers are
asymmetrically informed and no matter dealers’ prior beliefs about ω.
2 A General Model of Market Microstructure
Set-up: At time 0, Nature chooses a state ω in an arbitrary set Ω. In each period t = 1, 2, . . . ,
first n dealers choose an action profile in the finite set A. Second, traders react with an action in
the finite set S. Depending on the specific trading mechanism, a dealer’s action might specify bid
and ask quotes and maximum quantities dealers stand ready to trade, but it can also correspond
to a limit order or a market order in a limit order market, and/or to the trade in an inter-dealer
parallel market. Traders’ reactions can consist of market orders specifying the quantities to be
traded at dealers’ best quotes, and/or limit orders that will compete with existing limit orders.
LetW (ω) be the fundamental value of the risky asset in state ω. Dealers’ actions and traders’
reactions are publicly observable. For a given action profile a ∈ A of dealers’ actions and traders
reaction s ∈ S, let Qi(a, s) and Pi(a, s) denote the resulting amount of the risky asset and money,
respectively, that other market participants transfer to dealer i. Then, if the state of nature is
ω, dealer i’s stage payoff is
ui(ω, a, s) := W (ω)Qi(a, s)− Pi(a, s). (20)
Let F : Ω×A→ ∆S summarize traders’ behavior. Namely, F (ω, a, s) is the probability that, in
a given trading round, the traders’ reaction is s, given that the state of nature is ω and dealers’
actions are a. Thus, given state ω and dealers action profile a, we obtain dealer i’s expected
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stage payoff by taking the expectations with respect to the possible reactions s:
ui(ω, a) :=
∑
s∈S
ui(ω, a, s)F (ω, a, s). (21)
Let u := maxω,a,i |ui(ω, a)|. Stage game payoffs are discounted at the common discount factor
δ < 1.22
Note that uncertainty about the state of nature ω can be fundamental and/or non-fundamental.
Fundamental uncertainty pertains to the liquidation value of the asset. It affects dealers’ payoffs
directly through W (ω) and, because of the presence of traders with private information about
W (ω), indirectly via F (ω, ·). The non-fundamental uncertainty relates to the behavior of traders,
for example, it might pertain to their risk aversion, their inventory or the amount and quality of
the information they possess regarding the asset value. The non-fundamental uncertainty solely
affects F (ω, ·).
We define the information that can be gathered by observing the realization of the public
signal s. For any pair of states ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, we denote by A(ω, ω′) ⊆ ∆A the set of actions profiles
a satisfying F (ω, a) 6= F (ω′, a). A state ω can be statistically distinguished from ω′ only if
A(ω, ω′) 6= ∅. Let Ωˆ be the partition over Ω induced by the function F . That is, ω, ω′ ∈ ωˆ if
and only if A(ω, ω′) = ∅. We assume that Ωˆ is finite with cardinality M , and denote ωˆ(ω) the
element of Ωˆ containing ω ∈ Ω.
Note that the fact that the value of the asset differs in two states does not imply that the two
states are statistically distinguishable. This happens for instance when no trader can tell those
two states apart.23 Similarly, even if the value of the asset is the same in two states, the two
states could be distinguishable because the traders’ reaction could be different, possibly because
ω affects the traders’ risk aversion.
22As for the example of Section 1, δ can be interpreted as a measure of both time preference and the probability
that no public announcement disclosing ω is made within the period.
23For instance, in the model of Section 1, states that differ only for the ψ(ω) component are indistinguishable.
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We make the following Assumptions on ui(ω, a), that subsume our earlier assumptions and
Properties 1-4.
Assumption B: For any given ωˆ ∈ Ωˆ:
1. Positive maximum payoffs: There exists a non-empty set A⋆(ωˆ) ⊆ A, such that ui(ω, a) > 0
for all a ∈ A⋆(ωˆ), ω ∈ ωˆ and dealer i.
2. Negative minimum payoffs: There exists an action profile a(ωˆ) ∈ ∆A such that ui(ω, a(ωˆ)) <
0 for all ω ∈ ωˆ and dealer i.
3. Non-positive expected payoffs: For any given dealer i and probability measure µωˆ ∈ ∆ωˆ,
there exists ai−i (µωˆ) ∈ ×j 6=i∆Aj such that,
max
ai
∑
ω∈ωˆ
µωˆ(ω)ui
(
ω, ai, a
i
−i (µωˆ)
) ≤ 0.
4. Non-equivalent payoffs: There exist n action profiles {a1(ωˆ), . . . , an(ωˆ)} ∈ [∆A]n such that
ui(ω, a
i(ωˆ)) < ui(ω, a
j(ωˆ)) for all i 6= j and ω ∈ ωˆ.
Let u⋆ = miniminω minA⋆(ωˆ(ω)) ui (a, ω) > 0 denote a lower bound on payoffs from actions
in A⋆ (ωˆ). Roughly speaking, Assumptions B-1 and B-2 guarantee that for each statistically
distinguishable state ωˆ, there are action profiles providing each dealer with at least u⋆ > 0 and
action profiles leading to strictly negative payoffs, respectively. Assumption B-3 guarantees that
it is possible to punish each dealer in each state. Assumption B-4 states that for each ωˆ one can
find as many action profiles as there are dealers such that dealer i prefers all the other n − 1
action profiles to the i-th action profile.
Note that whenever the public information does not allow to pin down the exact value of
W (ω), as long as traders demand is elastic, and thus they are not willing to trade the asset at a
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too high expected loss, an action in A⋆(ωˆ) cannot conduce to a too imbalance change in dealers
aggregate inventory.
Equilibrium strategies ingredients: The following generalizes the construction of the ex-
ample of Section 2.
We start by defining a market measure pi. Let Π ⊆ ∆Ωˆ be a closed set of probability
distributions over Ωˆ and pi denote an element in Π. Let pi(ωˆ) denote the probability that pi
attaches to ωˆ. Let φ : Π × A × S → Π be a probability updating rule, i.e. pit+1 = φ(pit, at, st).
Thus, pit can be recursively computed from the map φ, given the sequence (aτ , sτ ) of actions
and signals, and the initial value pi0. We are interested in simple strategies such that, on the
equilibrium path and in each period t, dealers’ actions depend on pit (and possibly on st−1) only.
That is, given φ, we define a partial strategy to be a map σ : Π × S → ∆A. Instead, a public
strategy profile (strategy henceforth) is a mapping σˆ : ∪tH t → ×i∆Ai, where H t is the set of
histories ht = {aτ , sτ}t−1τ=0 specifying dealers’ actions and traders’ reactions until time t.
For a given updating rule φ and a partial strategy σ, we have the following definitions.
Definition 2 1. The pair (φ, σ) is ε-learning, for ε > 0, if for any ω ∈ Ω and any pi0 ∈ Π,
Pr
ω,σ
[
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=0
1{πt(ωˆ(ω))>1−ε} < 1− ε
]
< ε, (22)
2. The pair (φ, σ) is ε-exploiting, for ε > 0, if for all ωˆ ∈ Ωˆ and all ht such that pit(ωˆ) ≥ 1−ε,
we have Prσ [a
t ∈ A⋆(ωˆ)|ht] > 1− ε.
Let us say that that the market measure pit points to a state ωˆ if pit(ωˆ) ≥ 1− ε. Then we can
interpret the two definitions as follows: ε-learning means that, over many periods, the market
measure will not point at the ωˆ that contains the true state ω with a frequency that is smaller
than ε. In other words, the market measure is rarely far from the truth, in terms of long-run
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frequency. The ε-exploiting property guarantees that whenever the market measure points at a
some ωˆ, play is such that a dealers’ payoff is strictly positive in all states ω included in ωˆ.
For (φ, σ) to be ε-learning, note that it is necessary that dealers’ actions do not block the
flow of information coming from traders’ reactions. That is to say, no matter the level of the
market measure pi, the actions that allow to distinguish the true ωˆ from the other ωˆ′ ∈ Ωˆ must
be played with strictly positive frequency. Formally, (φ, σ) must be exploratory in the sense that
∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀ωˆ′ ∈ Ωˆ such that ωˆ′ 6= ωˆ(ω), and for any pi0 ∈ Π,
Pr
ω,σ
[
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=0
1{at∈A(ωˆ′,ωˆ(ω))} > 0
]
= 1. (23)
Note also that if, as in the illustrative example, the pair (φ, σ) is such that the expected time
required for the market measure to point at the true ωˆ is finite, then (φ, σ) satisfies (22).
Then we have the following:
Theorem 1 Suppose that Assumption B is satisfied. Then there exists ε¯ > 0 such that for any
ε < ε¯, if (φ, σ) is ε-learning and ε-exploiting, then there exists δ < 1 such that the outcome
induced by σ is a belief-free equilibrium outcome, for all δ ∈ (δ, 1).
That is, there exists a belief-free equilibrium σˆ that specifies the same action profile as the
partial strategy σ, after any history after which no player has deviated.
3 Extensions
Our environment is restrictive in several dimensions. In particular, dealers’ actions are ob-
served by all other dealers. Furthermore, the state of the world that determines the fundamentals
is fixed once for all at time 0. Also, long-term market participants do not take advantage of their
private information. Here, we sketch how the model can be extended and the analysis adapted
to deal with these modifications.
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A restriction of our model is that dealers’ actions are observable. This might not be the
case for some opaque markets as for instance when dealers’ quotes are anonymous. Imperfect
monitoring of actions makes it more difficult to detect a dealer’s deviating from the mutually
profitable collusive-type strategy. This reduces the threat of punishment and complicates imple-
menting collusive-like behaviors. However, this does not eliminate the dealers’ ability to sustain
a BFE, as long as equilibrium strategies are built in a way that make deviations detectable.
For example, Christie and Shultz (1994) document how Nasdaq dealers used to quote only on
even-eight quotes. Deviations from such a collusive scheme can be easily detected even when
quotes are anonymous. More generally, imperfect monitoring of players actions is not an issue
for the existence of a BFE (as demonstrated in Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2011)). However, im-
perfect monitoring of dealers’ actions might impose further restriction on the type of equilibrium
strategies that can be sustained in a BFE.
Allowing for fluctuations in the value of the asset raises no difficulty as long as these fluctu-
ations take place at a much slower rate than does the learning process. That is, in the definition
that (φ, σ) be ε-learning, we must now account for the fact that ωˆ(ωt) depends on time t. Hence,
the learning requirement is considerably stronger. We must think of learning the fundamental
value as occurring at another time scale as the fluctuations of the value itself –perhaps learning
occurs within a day of trading, an interval of time over which the fluctuations in the fundamental
value are sufficiently small to be considered negligible. If trading periods are at high frequency
(say, milliseconds), fundamentals hardly change from one such period to the next. Of course,
we have in mind that the flow of trades itself does not affect fundamentals. The verification
that σ is a belief-free equilibrium follows exactly the same steps as in the main proof. As for the
corresponding payoffs, if for every partial strategy, the pair consisting of the asset’s value and the
public signal follows an irreducible Markov chain, then computing the limiting payoff as δ → 1
is straightforward, by integration with respect to the invariant distribution. However, there is
clearly a tension between the assumption that the value of the asset changes slowly enough for
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learning to occur fast, and the assumption that market participants are patient enough for the
long-run distribution to be the only payoff-relevant aspect of the Markov chain. Therefore, if we
view δ (or rather, 1− δ) as capturing the delay between consecutive trades rather than intrinsic
patience by market participants, it makes little sense to assume that the fluctuations occur at
a rate that is independent of delay –higher δ should correspond to slower fluctuations of the
fundamentals. In that case, computing equilibrium payoffs as δ → 1 is more difficult.
A third important restriction is that long term market participants do not take advantage
of their private information, if any. One can view this as an implication of our definition of
belief-free equilibrium: dealers’ beliefs do not affect their actions because what really matters is
identifying the set of quotes that balance supply and demand coming from the mass of investors.
As these quotes can be ultimately learned from the observation of the trading flow, dealers’
private information is not crucial. However, in our equilibrium, dealers cannot take advantage
of the private information they might possess. Still, there is no difficulty in redefining belief-free
equilibrium appropriately. Rather than taking the asset value as a primitive that determines a
distribution over the players’ private signals, one can think of the players’ private signals as a
primitive that determines the asset’s value. In that case, we can re-define a strategy profile to be
belief-free if it is the case that, for every player, given his private signal, his strategy (that can
depend on his private signal) is optimal independently of the other players’ possible strategies.
That is, given a player’s signal, there is a set of signal profiles of his opponents that are consistent
with his; for each such signal profile, his opponents play some strategy profile. Belief-freeness
requires the player’s strategy to be optimal against all these profiles. In fact, it is clear that
we do not need to impose that the players’ combined signals pin down the value of the asset.
Rather, it pins down a set of possible values, for all of which the best-reply property must hold.
This provides a natural extension of the definition of belief-free equilibrium that allows deal-
ers to take advantage of their private information. We believe that such an extension raises
interesting questions and technical challenges that motivate further study.
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4 Conclusion
This paper considers market microstructure models in which long-lived dealers interact with
short-lived traders. We characterized equilibrium price formation strategies that are robust to
changes in dealers’ beliefs about fundamentals. Belief-free equilibria feature two key ingredients.
First, dealers collectively learn the value of those fundamentals that affect traders’ demand.
Second, for any given value of these fundamentals, dealers generate positive profits from the
intermediation of traders’ demand. This has has three robust implications that contrast with
those delivered by canonical microstructure models relying on the assumption of equally unin-
formed competitive dealers. First, dealers’ long-term profit is strictly positive independently of
the asset’s fundamental value. This profit is obtained through intermediation of traders’ demand.
Second, trading price need not reflect any of the dealers’ belief, and is generally more volatile
than prices that reflect the evolution of Bayesian beliefs. Third, dealers’ inventories tend to
be balanced even in the absence of risk aversion or institutional constraint. Given that belief-
free equilibrium is more stringent than traditional solution concepts, it might be surprising that
so much flexibility remains –in particular, equilibrium is not unique. Hence, we have focused
on a belief-free equilibrium with a simple Markovian structure. When applied to a version of
Glosten and Milgrom model, this explains well-documented stylized empirical facts. For specific
microstructure games, it might then be reasonable to focus on belief-free equilibria that satisfy
further criteria. For example, depending on the specific trading model considered, one could
analyze strategies that maximize dealers’ aggregate payoff or that minimize the expected time
required by the market measure to point at the true state, or even strategies that minimize the
aggregate cost of learning, or more generally strategies that form a belief-free equilibrium for the
lowest possible level of dealers’ patience.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Fix a game and a profile (φ, σ) satisfying the assumptions of the theorem and let ω be the
true state. Consider the play on the equilibrium path. Let qt be the probability that at time t
the market measure satisfies pit(ωˆ(ω)) > 1 − ε. Thus, following point 2 in Definition 2 and the
definitions of u⋆ and u, with probability qt, dealer i stage t payoff is at least (1−ε)u⋆−εu. Then,
at time τ ≥ 0, dealer i’s payoff satisfies
V δi (ω, σ|hτ) > (1− δ)
∞∑
t=τ
δt−τ
(
qt((1− ε)u⋆ − εu)− (1− qt)u)
= (1− ε)(u⋆ + u)(1− δ)
∞∑
t=τ
δtqt−τ − u. (24)
Now condition 1 of Definition 2, implies that
Pr
ω,σ
[
lim
δ→1
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=τ
δtqt−τ > 1− ε
]
> 1− ε. (25)
Hence we have that
lim
δ→1
V δi (ω, σ|hτ) > (1− ε)3(u⋆ + u)− (1 + ε)u. (26)
As the r.h.s. is strictly positive for ε = 0, it is also positive for all ε smaller than some ε > 0.
Continuity of V δi in δ implies there exists δ < 1 such that for ε < ε, dealer i’ s continuation
payoff V δi (ω, σ|hτ) is strictly positive.
The next step is to show that dealers have no profitable deviations. To this purpose we first
establish a simple lemma.
Lemma 1 For any given ωˆ ∈ Ωˆ, all ω ∈ ωˆ and any player i, and any a ∈ A⋆(ωˆ), there exist n
action profiles {a˜1(ωˆ), . . . , a˜n(ωˆ)} ∈ [∆A]n such that
0 < ui(ω, a˜
i(ωˆ)) < ui(ω, a˜
j(ωˆ)) < u(ω, a). (27)
for all i 6= j.
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Proof. Consider the convex combination
a˜i(ωˆ) := β1(ωˆ)β2(ωˆ)a(ωˆ) + β1(ωˆ) (1− β2(ωˆ)) ai(ωˆ) + (1− β1(ωˆ)) a, (28)
for some β1(ωˆ), β2(ωˆ) ∈ [0, 1], where a(ωˆ) satisfies Assumption B-2, and ai(ωˆ) is as in Assumption
B-4. Note that {a˜i(ωˆ)}i=1,...,n also satisfies Assumption B-4, as long as β1(ωˆ) > 0, β2(ωˆ) < 1.
Furthermore, because u (ω, a(ωˆ)) < 0, we can pick β2(ωˆ) close enough to one, and β1(ωˆ) close
enough to zero to guarantee that all payoffs are between 0 and u(ω, a).
We may now define n partial strategy profiles σi,ε as follows. Let AL denote a set of learning
action profiles satisfying A(ωˆ, ωˆ′)∩AL 6= ∅ for each couple ωˆ 6= ωˆ′. Let L denote the cardinality of
AL and Dωˆ denote the Dirac measure attaching probability 1 to ωˆ. If h
t is such that ‖pit −Dωˆ‖ <
ε, then let σi,ε (ht) = (1− ε) a˜i(ωˆ) + (ε/L) Σa∈ALa For all other ht, let σi,ε (ht) = (1/L)Σa∈ALa.
In addition, define n partial “punishment” strategies σi,ε as follows. Fix any ωˆ ∈ Ωˆ. Con-
dition B-3 guarantees that we can extend the Blackwell (1956) approachability argument to
the discounted case: for any η > 0 there is δη<0, mη < ∞ and mη-period strategy a−i(ωˆ)
for player −i such that if δ > δη, for any sequence {a1i , . . . , amηi } player i discounted payoff
during these mη periods is smaller than η in each ω ∈ ωˆ. This Blackwell strategy is then an
ingredient for the punishment partial strategy σi,ε. If ht is such that, for some ωˆi, pi
t assigns
probability no more than ε to states outside of ωˆi, but probability at least ε to all ω ∈ ωˆi, then
σi,ε (ht) = (1− ε) ai(ωˆi)(ht) + (ε/L)Σa∈ALa, where ai−i(ωˆi)(ht) as defined above and aii (ωˆi) is
some fixed action. Note that, for ε > 0, each of these strategies is exploratory. Furthermore,
given any σi, any ω, and any history h
t, the continuation payoff V δi
(
ω, σi, σ
i,ε
−i|ht
)
is such that
lim
δ→1,ε→0
V δi
(
ω, σi, σ
i,ε
−i|ht
) ≤ 0. (29)
From here, the proof is standard, see Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). Given the partial strategy
σ, define a strategy σˆ as follows. As long as no player unilaterally deviates, actions are specified
by σ. As soon as a player (say i) unilaterally deviates, play proceeds according to σi,ε for T
periods (for some ε > 0, T ∈ N to be specified). If during this i-punishment phase, some player
(say j) unilaterally deviates from σi,ε, play switches to the j-punishment phase, in which σj,ε is
played for T periods. If T periods elapse without unilateral deviations during the i-punishment
phase, play is then given by σi,ε. If there is a unilateral deviation from σi,ε by j, play switches to
the j-punishment phase, etc. It is now standard to show that, for T large enough, and ε small
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enough, there exists δ ≤ δ < 1 such that for all δ ∈ (δ, 1), players do not gain from deviating.
Note that this construction yields a belief-free equilibrium: The strategy are optimal irre-
spective of dealers’ beliefs about ω on and off the equilibrium path.

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